Four years and an estimated $5 billion after it shook up professional golf, LIV Golf could be shut down this week. The LIV Golf bankruptcy, filed in a New Jersey court in September, has reached its decisive point. Saudi Arabia's Public Investment Fund (PIF), the league's founder and now its senior lender, has set Friday, 30 October, as the date by which a rescue deal must be done. If it isn't, PIF can start winding the league down.
In our view, whatever happens on Friday, LIV has already taught sport its most expensive lesson of the decade: money can buy players, but it cannot buy a business.
What happened
LIV filed for Chapter 11 protection on 8 September with more than $500 million of debt, after PIF said it would stop funding the league beyond the 2026 season. Chapter 11 lets a company keep operating while it restructures, instead of closing straight away.
The court filings show how fast the money ran out. In June, PIF moved from owner to lender, with a $495 million secured loan to get LIV through its season. By the time it filed, LIV had about $15 million in cash and had laid off 289 employees, roughly 90% of its staff. Players were listed among its unsecured creditors, owed at least $45 million.
Three dates now decide its future:
25 October: the deadline for players to commit to "LIV 2.0", set by lead investor BC Partners Credit. It passed with no announcement, and BC Partners can extend it.
30 October: PIF's deadline for a deal before it can begin a wind-down.
5 November: the next court hearing, where the judge expects to learn which way it has gone.
Where the $5 billion went
LIV spent heavily on the things that make a league look big. It paid guaranteed contracts to sign star players, offered large prize purses and staged global events with concerts. What it never built was the income that pays for those things year after year.
The clearest number is in the filings. Broadcast rights brought in only about 5% of LIV's revenue, mainly through a US deal with Fox and smaller deals abroad. For comparison, the PGA Tour has earned up to 67% of its core revenue from media rights. Sponsorship did better, at about $102 million in 2025, roughly half of LIV's revenue. That suggests total revenue of around $200 million a year.
That gap is the story. Top-level sport runs on television and streaming money, because broadcasters pay for audiences. LIV paid for stars first and hoped the audience would follow. It never arrived in big enough numbers.
LIV's chief restructuring officer told the court that, with continued funding, the league could have become profitable within five to seven years. In our view, that is the problem in one sentence. A business that needs seven more years of someone else's money is not yet a business.
LIV 2.0: can players-as-owners work?
The rescue plan flips LIV's model. Instead of paying players as hired stars, it would make them owners.
Under BC Partners' proposal, players would hold 52.5% of the new league, with BC Partners and other investors holding 45% and management 2.5%. Players would also get about 30% of the teams they play for, new contracts with signing bonuses and some of their image rights back. BC Partners would provide up to $300 million of financing, plus the right to own a future expansion team.
The catch is numbers. BC Partners has said it needs at least 30 to 40 players committed. According to the Financial Times, about 15 have tentatively signed up. Jon Rahm, winner of the last three LIV individual titles, has told the court through his lawyers that he will not take part. Dustin Johnson is reported to be leading a group of players seeking severance payments from PIF instead. Bryson DeChambeau, LIV's biggest remaining name, has not announced his decision.
Staying now carries a new cost. The DP World Tour has said any player under contract with LIV 2.0 will not be eligible for its tour in 2027. Players must choose between a smaller, riskier LIV and a full-time place on an established tour.
Who wins and who loses
Winners
The PGA Tour and DP World Tour. Their biggest rival is weaker, and they can welcome players back on their own terms.
BC Partners. If the deal goes ahead, it buys into a global league for a fraction of what PIF spent, with an expansion team included.
Players with big personal brands. For a star like DeChambeau, who has built a large YouTube following, getting image rights back may matter more than prize money.
Losers
PIF. About $5 billion in, it is now a lender trying to recover what it can.
Mid-ranking LIV players. They gave up tour careers for guaranteed money that has stopped. Now they face smaller purses or an uncertain way back.
Staff, venues and suppliers. Hundreds of jobs have already gone, and venues with events planned for 2027 are still waiting for answers.
What it means for India
India's link is personal. Anirban Lahiri has been the only Indian on LIV since its first season in 2022, playing for DeChambeau's Crushers GC. Speaking at the DP World India Championship in Delhi this month, he described the situation as changing fast. He said his decision would come down to what is best for his family, and he has not committed to LIV 2.0.
The DP World Tour's 2027 rule makes his choice sharper. For an Indian golfer, a full-time place on a tour that already stages an event in India may now be worth more than a seat in a smaller league.
There is a wider lesson for Indian sport too. India has seen a wave of new franchise leagues over the last decade, many leaning on a single owner or sponsor. LIV shows what to watch: is broadcast and ticket income growing, or is one backer covering the gap? Leagues that last earn their audience first and pay for stars second.
The question that matters
LIV changed golf for good. Players are paid more across the sport now, and the idea of team golf with player ownership will outlive the league in some form. But LIV also showed that no amount of money can skip the hard part: building an audience that broadcasters and sponsors will pay for.
So here is the question worth asking: if LIV 2.0 survives as a smaller, player-owned league, can it do with $300 million what it could not do with $5 billion?
At The Sports Columnist, we cover the deals, the money and the decisions behind sport. Every game has a second scoreboard, and golf has just shown that a cheque book is not a business plan.
Sources: LIV Golf's Chapter 11 filings in the US Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey; LIV Golf, BC Partners and DP World Tour statements
Read more from The Sports Columnist
comments.
0 commentsNo comments yet. Be the first to join the conversation.